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BOOK REVIEW
"God's Litigator"
A Review Essay of Mere Creatures of the State?
Education, Religion, and the Courts:
A View from the Courtroom
Douglas W. Kmie*
William Bentley Ball' is likely the most experienced and respected litigator in matters of church and state in America. In
some ways, a review of this .moderately sized volume could easily
dwell upon the importance of Mr. Ball's trial and appellate advocacy and his willingness to shoulder for an entire professional
career the task of safeguarding what has been called America's
first freedom-the freedom of religion. But it is plain that such
autobiography is not Mr. Ball's purpose. Rather, as he states early,
this book provides the "view from below" 2 -that is, the view of the
"dramas, stories of real people and remarkable events"' that
shaped the Court's Religion Clause cases in this century. As Ball
notes, these cases are not the tabloid stuff of "bloody gloves,"
rather, these decisions seek to answer the "overarching" question
of our times: "How far the state shall have power over our lives."4
More particularly, these cases pose over and over again the question asked by the book's title: Are our children "mere creatures of
the state?"
Certainly, it will always be hoped that this question will be answered negatively in the heart of every parent each day.' Catholic
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Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.

I J.D., University of Notre Dame, 1948; partner, Ball, Skelly, Murren & Connell,
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
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WILLIAM BENTLEY BALL, MERE CREATURES OF THE STATE? EDUCATION, RELIGION,

(1994).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 In a February 1995 poll conducted by Luntz Research for the Of the People
Foundation of Arlington, Virginia, 94% answered "parents" and 3% answered "government" to the question: "Who do you feel should be primarily responsible for making
decisions concerning the upbringing and education of children-parents or the government?" (Survey available from Of the People Foundation (703) 351-5051).
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social teaching declares unequivocally that "those in society who
are in charge of schools must never forget that the parents have
been appointed by God himself as the first and principal educators of their children and their right is completely inalienable."'
Surprisingly, given the tremendous legally tolerated or legally inspired encroachment on parental authority existing today, the title
question was also answered negatively seventy years ago by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus
and May.7 Pierce rejected an Oregon law making it a crime for
parents to enroll their children in any but public schools. The
Court wrote: "The child is not the mere creature of the state;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."' But as forceful as that judicial statement appears, it has not settled matters. As Ball recounts throughout this
volume, in terms of both economic freedom and intrusive regulation, the state still competes with and frequently displaces parents
as primary educators.
In rejecting Oregon's mandatory public school attendance law
in Pierce, the Court likened the state's competition with parents to
the platonic ideal that "'children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent' . . . [i]n
order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens. " '
Plato's prescription, even as a matter of speculative philosophy, is
jarring and strikes even the most disinterested parent as unnatural.
But surely, to many well-intentioned public educators, the platonic
analogy paints the state's interest in public schooling too starkly. Is
it not possible to see the public school, not as contradiction of
parent, but rather as supplement, sustaining a common culture? In
other words, is not the primary objective of a government school
the nourishing, among children of all faiths, an appreciation for
what Tocqueville described as "ideas in common" or "beliefs ready
made"? 0

6
printed
7
8
9
10

Pope John Paul II, The Apostolic Exhortation on the Family (Familiaris Consortio), rein 11 ORIGINS 437, 451 (1981) (paragraph 40).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 535,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (citing Plato).
Tocqueville writes:

[N]o society could prosper without such beliefs, or rather that there are no societies which manage in that way. For without ideas in common, no common
action would be possible, and without common action, men might exist, but
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"Beliefs ready made" are very much akin to "self-evident
truths." And along these lines, the drafters of the Religion Clauses
viewed religious freedom not only as an important and sensitive
good in itself, but also as a means to significant ends. The ends
were made explicit in the Declaration of Independence," which
affirmed those "self-evident truths," including the existence of a
Creator God, upon which the American republic, and indeed, all
men and women depend for the understanding of existence itself.
As John Courtney Murray has written:
[T]he American Proposition rests on the more traditional conviction that there are truths; that they can be known; they must
be held; for, if they are not held, assented to, consented to,
worked into the texture of institutions, there can be no hope
of founding a true City, in which men may dwell in dignity,
peace, unity, justice, well-being, freedom.'"
The interests of the state in matters of schooling, to portray it
most benignly and partially ahistorically, 3 might be said then not
to have the crass purpose of stealing children away to some hypothetical common where platonic descendants would neuter their
individuality, but rather, the purpose of safeguarding the American
philosophy of self-evident truth from one generation to the next.
This description of public school purpose seems not only meritorious in the midst of America's "culture war," 4 but also a congethere could be no body social. So for society to exist and, even more, for society to prosper, it is essential that all the minds of the citizens should always be
rallied and held together by some leading ideas; and that could never happen
unless each of them sometimes came to draw his opinions from the same source
and was ready to accept some beliefs ready made.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 433-34 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., 1969); cf Amy Gutman, Democratic Schools and Moral Education, 1 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 461 (1985) (arguing for the public school as an educator
of common culture).
11 The understanding of the Declaration as constitutional document has recently
been made more luminous by the scholarship of Professor Trisha Olson, whose carefully
documented article on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
reveals how the Framers of that Amendment drafted it as a specification of the received
higher law principles embodied in the Declaration. See Trisha Olson, The Natural Law
Foundation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 48 ARK. L. REV.
347 (1995).
12 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, SJ., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS at ix (1960).
13 As Mr. Ball reveals, part of the push for the public or government school monopoly derived from antireligious and anti-immigrant sentiment. BALL, supra note 2, at
12, 21.
14 See JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WAARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991);
DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, CEASE-FIRE ON THE FAMILY: THE PURSUIT OF VIRTUE AND THE END OF
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nial premise to religious freedom and tolerance. For example, as
Richard John Neuhaus writes in his eloquent and discerning foreword to Mr. Ball's book, "the founders specifically designed a
government that would be accountable to higher sovereignties."15
In the parlance of the founding, the people are the proximate
sovereign, though the people themselves affirm the higher sovereignty of God. Any doubt on this score should be allayed by the
Declaration's tracing of inalienable right to "the law of nature and
nature's God."
But, somehow-and Mr. Ball's book reveals an important part
of the how in the context of Religion Clause litigation-the American proposition as re-stated in present-day Supreme Court opinion, be it popularly conceived as liberal or conservative, has severed its connection with God and the self-evident truths; truths
that can be derived from reasoned reflection upon a created human nature.
Arguably, Mr. Ball's effort can be seen as friendly to Dr. Harry Jaffa's broader enterprise of exposing the similar severance of
constitutional means from philosophical purpose in original intent
jurisprudence, especially as that has been described by Judge Robert Bork. 6 The dispute within the originalist camp is too involved
to chronicle here. Yet, even though it involves Ball in a fight he
does not discuss, 7 it is worth a brief digression. Essentially, the

AMERICA'S CULTURE WAR (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript on file with author); Douglas
W. Kmiec, America's "Culture War"-The Sinister Denial of Virtue and the Decline of Natural
Law, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 183 (1993).
15 Richard J. Neuhaus, Preface, in BALL, supra note 2, at vii, ix.
16 Compare HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION (1994) with ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCrION OF THE LAW (1990). See also Jaffa v. Bork: An Exchange, NAT'L REV.,

Mar. 21, 1994, at 56.
17 My colleague Thomas Shaffer rightly points out that Mr. Ball in litigation did not
fully specify a reliance upon the Declaration as the "consistent set of philosophical principles" against which constitutional interpretation is to be measured. True, neither in litigation nor in this book does Mr. Ball articulate this focus as forthrightly as it is presented
in this review essay. But, as Ball's reference to the Declaration as "the preamble to the
Preamble to the Constitution," BALL, supra note 2, at 8, I believe fairly suggests, the time
for intellectual timidity on this score has long since passed. The Constitution, as amended, contains various claims of freedom (religion and speech for example); it is the Declaration that anchors these claims of freedom in good purpose, or if you will, the common
good. We are not free to use either speech or religion to undermine the common
good, yet, this is only comprehended when the Declaration's acceptance of "self-evident
truths" is part of the organic law of the First Amendment. Similarly, an acceptance of
the Declaration's self-evident truths strengthens the federalist structure of the Constitution
by reminding us that the application of general, self-evident truths takes place within the
smaller sovereignties of state and local government, and often, outside of government
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dispute asks whether the Constitution is understandable without
the Declaration of Independence. Bork says it is, and Jaffa says it
is not. Jaffa has the better of it, though not without some caution.
Judge Bork and his formidable intellectual allies18 are rightly
skeptical of judges who disregard constitutional text to conveniently inject their own political or personal preference. What the Bork
camp misses, however, is that constitutional text can rarely be fully
comprehended, except in light of the nation's fundamental definition of purpose in the Declaration. 9
Dr. Jaffa is fond of citing originalist support to make his case.
He notes, for example, commentary by Madison and Jefferson that
the Declaration was "the first of the best guides to the principles
of the Constitution."0 So too, The Federalist makes reference to
"the transcendent law of nature and nature's God"2 as well as
other fundamental principles of the Revolution. From this, Dr.
Jaffa logically reasons that "the standards by which the Constitution is to be justified and defended, are prior both logically and
chronologically to the Constitution itself."' As Mr. Ball writes
similarly, "[t]he Declaration was, in a sense, the preamble to the
Preamble to the Constitution. " s Bork and company frequently
complain that these are no more than intellectual snippets, not
enough to make the "self-evident truths" of the Declaration a full-

altogether in church, family, and workplace.
18 See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper, Hary Jaffa's Bad Originalim, 1994 PUB. INTEREST L
REV. 189.
19 The debates surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment in the 39th Congress make
this clear. For example, Senator Poland spoke of the purpose of § 1 of the Amendment
which was to allow congressional enforcement of "principles . . . essentially declared in
the Declaration of Independence and in all other provisions of the Constitution." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866) (Sen. Poland). Similarly, Professor Howard
Graham after his study of the 1830s reminded legal scholars writing in the 1950s that
"[a] generation which enshrines the document of 1787 rather than that of 1776 needs to
be reminded that originally the Declaration not only was a part of American constitutional law, it was the [superior or paramount law]." Howard J. Graham, The Early AntiSlavery
Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 610, 612.
20 Harry V. Jaffa, Slaying the Dragon of Bad Originalism:Jaffa Answers Cooper, 1995 PUB.
INTEREST L REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with the author).
21 THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
22 Jaffa, supra note 20 (manuscript at 38, on file with author).
23 BALL, supra note 2, at 8. My colleague Gerard Bradley characterizes this as the
Founders' commitment of the constitutional structure to the "common good," which "did
not depend upon the truth of those matters that distinguished" various religious sects
even as both the common good and truth fully depended upon God. See Gerard V.
Bradley, Dea vu, All Over Again: The Supreme Court Revisits Religious Liberty, CRISIS, April
1995, at 39, 40.
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bodied part of originalism, a part of the organic law. But as both
Dr. Jaffa and legal historian Philip Hamburger have written,24 the
Framers did not think they had to constantly cite the obvious.'
But what does all this have to do with public schools and religious liberty? Plenty. The severance of the Declaration from the
Constitution bemoaned by Dr. Jaffa obscures the American philosophy, and with it, destroys the benign, "common culture" purpose
of the public school. And if indeed there is no common culture
that informs human inquiry, then families within the manifold
faith traditions that had been sheltered or accommodated by that
common culture are left puzzled over exactly what the public
schools are up to. Worse, too many families of different faiths
discover that the individual public or government school that
matters to them most-theirs-has been absorbed by secular ideologies of modern man that do not recognize the transcendent
value of human life or exalt the pursuit or redistribution of material goods over all else or that purvey a wholly gratification-based
view of human sexuality. In these places, the conflict between parent and school is often sharp, and the question of this book's title
gets asked in matters of book selection, curriculum, hiring, and
teaching emphasis.
We can be reasonably confident that out of the natural law of
the Framers would never confuse libel and perjuDeclaration,
the
ry with protected speech." So too, Mr. Ball reveals how the Framers would think it perverse to see the religious freedom of the

Constitution as banning reference to or reliance upon God in
matters of education. As Mr. Ball puts it, religious liberty was guaranteed as essential "because religion itself was thought to be.""

24 Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102
YALE L.J. 907 (1993); see also Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration
of Independence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L.Q. 361 (1993).
25 "[C]ivil law was expected to reflect natural law." Hamburger, supra note 24, at
909. Thus, even if, based upon the national stature of Judge Bork as the spokesman for
faithful originalism, the burden of proof rests with those advocating the Declaration as
part of the organic law, that burden has been amply met by the explicit and repeated
consideration of this matter in the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Olson,
supra note 11, at 417-19. As Professor Olson reveals throughout the congressional debate,
law was viewed from the natural law perspective-that is, as declared, rather than merely
made. For this reason, Congressman Bingham, the chief proponent of the Amendment in
the House, would state in numerous ways the view that the Constitution rests on "the
transcendent right of nature, and nature's God." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1089 (1866).
26 See Hamburger, supra note 24, at 935-36.
27 BALL, supra note 2, at 9.
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In this, good law depended upon morality, which in turn, depended upon religion, even as-plainly and textually-it did not, and
should not, depend upon an established religion. In petitioning
for religious freedom in Virginia, Madison thus saw no incongruity
in first invoking the sovereignty of the "Governour of the Uni28
verse."
The Supreme Court's disregard of the Constitution's natural
law moorings in the Declaration began scarcely fifty years ago.Y
With this disregard, the Court lost sight of the meaning of religious liberty. In the colloquial, it mistook freedom of religion for
freedom from religion. Rather than understanding the Establishment Clause as a vehicle for advancing the free exercise of religion, "the means (no establishment) [was] turned into the end,
and the end (free exercise) [was] viewed as a terrible nuisance."10
Nowhere was this felt more strongly than in the public school.
The public school that in an earlier era had acknowledged God as
the ultimate authority for the American experiment was "forced to
substitute secular and utilitarian values."3 '
Mr. Ball undertakes to explain the disfigurement of the Es2
tablishment Clause through the litigation of Lemon v. Kurtzman,1
which despite virtually unanimous judicial scorn as an unhelpful
"ghoul-like" apparition,3 3 remains the prevailing Supreme Court
standard in the establishment area. The case was triggered by
Pennsylvania legislation in the late 1960s designed to allow the
state to purchase from, and therefore reimburse, nonpublic
schools for educational services in mathematics, physical science,
physical education, and modern foreign languages. Mr. Ball defended the statute in trial and on appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court. While the Pennsylvania constitution, like many state constitutions, contains an express prohibition of funding sectarian institutions (a fact that Ball documents as originating in anti-Cath-

28 Id. (quoting Madison).
29 Or at least it did not fully surface in the Religion Clause cases until the latter
half of this century. The misinterpretation of these Clauses may be traceable, however, to
the older substitution of positivism for the natural law tradition which began with the
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See Olson, supra note 11, at 432.
30 Neuhaus, supra note 15, at ix.
31 BALL, supra note 2, at 14.
32 403 U.S. 602 (1970).
33 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (Justice Scalia referred to the Lemon test
as "[l]ike some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that... stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening . . . little children and school attorneys.").

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 70:5

olic bigotry 4 ), supporters argued that the particular services
sought to be funded were nonsectarian and obviously fulfilled a
public purpose that would otherwise have to be borne by the state
taxpayer.
This is not a hollow argument. As suggested more extensively
below, it deserves conscientious attention as a matter of distributive justice-that is, the proportionate distribution of burdens and
benefits within the community. But the argument did not prevail
in Lemon, but Mr. Ball reveals, it was not solely a Catholic argument, then or now. For example, in the 1960s when the
Pennsylvania legislation was pending, Orthodox Jewish leaders
spoke in support noting that "the practical effect of the present
situation is to tax the parent of each child that attends a religious
school; this is obvious discrimination." 5 True, there was Protestant opposition in the 1960s. Ball attributes much of this to the
residual Protestant mindset which still saw the public school as its
own,3 6 or at least as supportive of a shared culture premised upon the Declaration. Today, with government schools forced by
dubious legal interpretation to disown the philosophical premises
of the nation, the Protestant and the Orthodox Jewish communities have found even greater common cause with the Catholic
7
community.
The argument for a proportionate sharing with all
schools-public and religious--of education funds raised from the
taxes of all citizens initially won favor as well in the lower court.
Seeing no need for a trial, the district court summarily held in
Lemon that "no state could exclude individuals 'because of their
faith or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation."'" It is worth noting that in that crisp statement the
trial judge properly captured that the object of the Establishment
Clause is the promotion of religious freedom, and this freedom
very much includes the fair distribution of public benefit.
In retelling the story of the Lemon litigation, Mr. Ball mentions without discussion the Court's determination a few years
before that had invalidated Bible reading and the recitation of the

34 BALL, supra note 2, at 20-24.
35 Id.
Tmimim).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.

at 25 (quoting the testimony of Aaron D. Twerski of the Yeshiva Achei
at 23.
at 78.
at 28 (quoting Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
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Lord's Prayer in public school classrooms. 9 As Mr. Ball observes,
it was in this case that the first two prongs of Lemon originated-secular purpose and not having the primary effect of advancing' religion. Mr. Ball comments that the Pennsylvania funding
statute he was defending in Lemon "passed that test with flying
colors,"4 but he does not disclose whether he thought those requirements had any merit. This is part of a litigator's perspective
of course-to deal with the hand dealt him-but in marvelously
clear, twenty-twenty retrospect one wonders if the litigation strategy
might not have been better aimed at challenging. the test itself.
Implicit in the test from the beginning was the mistaken assumption of neutrality between religion and no religion. The Declaration of Independence is not neutral-God exists; God created
man; man has inalienable rights by his created nature.
This is not to say that neutrality is senseless. But what little
sense it contains, can be found only after parents are unjustly denied a proportionate share of the tax-derived general education
fund and coerced by law and the economic weight of double taxation to
send their children to the government school. These many years
later there is a plausible argument that Mr. Ball directed high
talent and litigation energy in Lemon, and subsequently in Meek v.

39 School Dist. of Abingdon Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
40 The second prong of this so-called "establishment" test is actually a curious admixture of the establishment and free exercise precepts. The test originated in Schempp,
where Justice Clark was opining in dicta upon the meaning of both Religion Clauses,
when he remarked: "Thus, [the] two clauses may overlap. [The] test may be stated as
follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
power as circumscribed by the Constitution." 374 U.S. at 222. Interestingly, as Mr. Ball
restates Schenpp, he describes the second prong as not having "a primary effect advancing
religion." BALI, supra note 2, at 29. Ball's omission of "or inhibition of religion" reflects
the emphasis that the Court has given the second prong in litigation-that is, the Court
has only been alert to establishment violations, almost wholly slighting free exercise concerns. This effectively transforms the second prong and thus the governing constitutional
objective into the exclusion or avoidance of religion, when the purpose of the Religion
Clauses taken together was to advance individual freedom of religion. Justice Stewart perceived this bias in Schempp and in his dissent wrote:
[P]rovisions authorizing religious exercises are properly to be regarded as measures making possible the free exercise of religion. But it is important to stress
[that] the question presented is not whether exercises such as those at issue
here are constitutionally compelled, but rather whether they are constitutionally
invalid. And that issue, in my view, turns on the question of coercion."
374 U.S. at 316 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Indeed, it does.
41 BALL, supra note 2, at 29.
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Pittenger," toward explaining why second-best funding plans, like
the Pennsylvania legislation, did not violate an unwarranted premise-the need for neutrality between religion and no religion. As it
turned out, when Lemon reached the Supreme Court, the Justices
invalidated Mr. Ball's Pennsylvania legislation notwithstanding his
explanation. The Court did this by affirming what certainly should
be true if it is not, and that is, religious schools-even in secular
subjects-can never be neutral. Morality, as St. Augustine reminds
us, governs all of life, even geography, mathematics, and the study
of language. Thomas Jefferson reminded us of this too, in the
Declaration, which means, of course, that even government
schools-if they wish to be true to the government that created
them-cannot be neutral toward God's existence either.
Nonetheless, there is a significant difference between a government school's non-neutrality, or value commitments, and those
of a religious school. The government's "self-evident truths" are
few and highly general; indeed, so general, that religious revelation within particular faiths is, in my judgment, needed to make
any meaningful application of them in one's day-to-day life, or in
the life of the larger community." This is not to say that the
government's affirmation of self-evident truth is insignificant; it is
indeed critical, because it is that affirmation which invites my faith
tradition and yours to freely specify within individual life and
congregation exactly what "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" means for abortion, homosexual sodomy, assisted suicide,
heterosexual fornication, responsible stewardship of property and
environmental resource, and many other topics.
Along these lines, even as it is valuable for defining the playing field of rational inquiry,44 the government's declaration of

42 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
43 There is a healthy debate among natural lav scholars over how much is knowable
by reason alone, and hence can serve as universal moral norm, and that which can only
be understood with revelation. Compare Carl F.H. Henry, Natural Law and a Nihilistic Culture, FIRST THINGS, January 1995, at 54 (taking the position that more depends on revelation and man's will to follow it) with Correspondence, On Natural Law: Carl EH. Henry
& Critics, FIRST THINGS, April 1995, at 2, 2-8 (various replies to Henry's article).
44 Many metaphors for the relationship between the Declaration and Constitution
are possible. I am grateful to Robert C. Cannada, Esq., senior member of Butler, Snow,
O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada of Jackson, Mississippi, who has unselfishly dedicated much
research and writing to this issue for the playing field metaphor. On occasion, Mr.
Cannada has also likened the Declaration and the Constitution to that of corporate charter and by-laws. As he has written to me in correspondence, "[t]he by-laws must be interpreted in accordance with the charter or the corporation will have no stated purpose."
Letter from Robert C. Cannada to Douglas W. Kmiec (on file with the author).
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self-evident truth is too indeterminate to form the basis for comprehensive educational instruction. Whenever educators take the
first step beyond the simple affirmation of the inalienable value of
life, for example, they are forced to grapple with philosophical,
metaphysical, and primarily, religious ideas of what life consists.
And when the government takes that step, whatever it decides, it
will divide, it will impose, and it will oppress the religious faith of
those whose conscientious study of the Bible, the Koran, or the
Torah place them in disagreement. From a far different perspective than my own, this, I believe, was Professor Paul Freund's
warning against improper entanglements between church and
state,45 which Mr. Ball cites with displeasure as being the basis for
his loss before the Supreme Court in Lemon.
Ball thinks Freund's analysis slipshod, and essentially anti-Catholic.' It does not have the usual footnoting of a scholarly article,
and as Ball recounts, it originated as a speech that received first
publication in a less scholarly journal than its subsequent reprinting in the Harvard Law Review, to which the Court makes reference." But Freund's thinking, which yields the third "no excessive entanglement" prong of Lemon's now enfeebled standard does
make some sense. The significance of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment is that it puts most of the specification or application of truth, beyond the more general self-evident truths of the
Declaration, off limits to government actors. Truth is not a matter
of majority vote. When truth is made a matter of majority vote,
religious oppression often begins, and that oppression ends in
alienation, or worse, violence. Just stand outside an abortion clinic
for a while, or at greater risk, go inside.
Law, of course, has to reach or impose some minimal consensus. Nevertheless, the consensus must be ever-observant not to
contradict the self-evident truth of the Declaration. The best way
to do that is to leave as much specification of truth as possible to
smaller sovereigns-individual family, church, school, workplace,
local and state government.4" This is the explicit design of our

45
46
47
48

Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (1969).
BALL, supra note 2, at 33-39.
Id. at 34.
The self can only be reasonably understood in these communities. See generally

MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 109-20

(1991)

(the rigid insistence on individual right is at the expense of sensitive intermediate

institutions, such as the family); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUS-

TICE (1982). As Professor Durham and Alexander Dushku have written:
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constitutional structure. Consider, for example, the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments,4 9 and, arguably, the Fourteenth as well.'
Nevertheless, Mr. Ball highlights for particular criticism the following passage from Lemon: "It conflicts with our whole history
'and tradition to permit questions of the Religion Clause to assume
such importance in our legislatures and in our elections that they
could divert attention from the myriad issues and problems which
confront every level of government."5 The Court's statement is
not felicitous. It suggests that religious questions are unimportant,
and it is that suggestion that Mr. Ball rightly takes to task. But the
true sentiment of that statement is that religion questions are too
important to be left to the government. In the shadow of a constitutionally insupportable conception of the commerce power which
allows a bloated federal government to regulate anything it
wants," Freund's argument seems wrong because it removes religious adherents from the only game in town-specifying moral
truths in federal law. But what is wrong is the game itself, for
when the Court allowed the commerce power to expand, it allowed far too many specifications and applications of self-evident
truth to be wrongfully taken from family and church. This invites
a nation to be perpetually at odds over its own culture. s

[L]iberalism is skewed toward atomizing individualism from the beginning and
cannot adequately account for the significance of religion and tradition in social
life. The practical consequence of this bias is that insufficient attention is paid
to protecting the intermediary institutions that perform the critical nurturing
role that excessively individualist liberalism leaves out of its account.
W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism, Secularism, and the Transformative
Dimension of Religious Institutions, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 421, 432.
49 See DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 17-46, 132-51 (1992).
50 For a discussion contrary to the popular view that the Fourteenth Amendment
was a wholesale transfer of state to federal power, and thus a transformation, BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 45-46 (1991), see Akhil R- Amar, The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 1193 (1992). Professor Olson argues that the drafters
of the Amendment viewed the states as bound by the first eight amendments and other
specifications of national privilege even without the Amendment, and that the Amendment was "to arm the Congress of the United States . . .with the power to enforce the
bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution . . . ." Olson, supra note 11, at 426 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (Congressman Bingham)).
51 BALL, supra note 2, at 38 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23 (emphasis supplied
by Mr. Ball)).
52 See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec & Eric L. Diamond, New Federalism is Not Enough: Die
Privatization of Non-Public Goods, 7 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 321, 323-35 (1984).
53 Properly construed, the Religion Clauses create important moral space for smaller
sovereigns like families and church congregations to form individual conscience along
specific moral and faith traditions, without having these traditions imposed on others. See
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In my judgment, Mr. Ball's litigation course at beginning,
aimed as it was toward the segregation and funding of supposedly
secular subjects in religious school, was less well fashioned than
the important success he has achieved more recently. The early
cases sought to keep religious schools in a maldefined game. A
game that marginalizes religion by implicitly insisting that it has to
be kept separate from real (viz. secular) education. Mr. Ball's later
efforts put parents back in charge, and in so doing, were better
positioned to refute the dubious premise that the only acceptable
public discourse is one shorn of all religious reference.'
In those early cases, Lemon, and again in Meek v. Pittenger,5
Mr. Ball did build an impressive factual record at trial to demonstrate that the provision of auxiliary services in various forms (salary reimbursement for secular subjects; remedial testing; speech
and hearing examinations) and the supply of instructional equipment (projectors, laboratory equipment) would not occasion the
entanglement posited by Professor Freund. Mr. Ball relied upon
the promises of good faith and professionalism of the educators
who would be supplying the service. The record was ample with
this testimony; the Supreme Court didn't believe it, or at least, it
did not fully credit it. Unlike Mr. Ball, I believe the Court was
correct in not doing so. In striking down the program, the Court
wrote:
Whether the subject is "remedial reading," "advanced reading,"
or simply "reading," a teacher remains a teacher, and the danger that religious doctrine will become intertwined with secular
instruction persists. The likelihood of inadvertent fostering of
religion may be less in a remedial arithmetic class than in a
medieval history seminar, but a diminished probability of im-

Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REv. 477, 534-50
(1991). But the Religion Clauses, even if properly construed, can facilitate little in behalf
of these smaller sovereigns if the misconstruction of federal commerce power or substantive due process allows Congress or the Court to occupy the field. Seldom is the unlimited nature of the modem commerce power and the judicial adventures in the name of
substantive due process understood as threats to religious freedom, but they very obviously are. The Constitution must be construed as an internally consistent document.
54 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 359 (1984); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 3-30 (1980). Professor Frederick Gedicks
ably indicates that similar views have resonated in Supreme Court adjudication, resulting
in "[tlhe privileging of secular knowledge in public life as objective and the
marginalizing of religious belief in private life as subjective." Frederick M. Gedicks, Public
Lfe and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L REV. 671, 681 (1992).
55 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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As I say, Mr. Ball thinks the Court wrong to disregard the record,
to find dangers where none exist, to see religion "in purely secular matters.15 7 But again, that's the rub-if a religious school is
genuinely being a religious school are there any purely secular matters? For the sake of religious schools, for the sake of a national
culture that desperately yearns for a rich and informed religious
base, I hope not. I bet had he not been backed into this awkward
posture by prior case law," Mr. Ball might hope not, too. The
need for thoroughly informed religious education is what makes
this tactic-to "sanitize," to "secularize," or to separately fund putatively secular aspects of religious schools-so hopeless.
Curiously, Mr. Ball sees the loss of significant religious reference more clearly in the Establishment Clause cases he did not
litigate personally-the religious college cases. Mr. Ball recounts
how the presidents of Catholic colleges in the late 1960s felt a
strong need to "secularize" in order to gain both government
assistance and acceptance among the "more sophisticated" ranks of
higher education. Ball takes issue with a Fordham study that
"urged [religious] colleges [to] take overt steps to rid themselves
of vital aspects of their religious character. " " Also coming in for
criticism is the 1967 Land O'Lakes statement which Mr. Ball describes as concluding that "Catholic higher education must divorce
itself from episcopal authority."' Today, this is the modus vivendi
of many American Catholic colleges, as suggested by the resistance
to the implementation of the Holy Father's mild reassertion of ecclesiastical supervision in his encyclical Ex Corde Ecclesiae6 As Mr.

56 Id. at 370-71.
57 BALL, supra note 2, at 45.
58 In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court upheld a program which in effect paid the transportation costs of parochial school students. Similarly,
in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the Court upheld a program of
providing secular textbooks to parochial schools.
59 BALL, supra note 2, at 40.
60 Id. (citing GEORGE A. KELLY, KEEPING THE CHURCH CATHOLIC WITH JOHN PAUL II
72-73, 77 (1990)).
61 Reprinted in 20 ORIGINS 265 (1990). The proposed ordinances of the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops implementing this encyclical would give local bishops authority to more or less certify whether the Catholic theological instruction within Catholic
theology departments was, in fact, Catholic theology. If it was not, it could be taught as
philosophy or contemporary Catholic or political commentary, but not represented as the
magisterium-or the teaching authority of the church.
In November 1993, the presidents of Georgetown, Saint Louis University, Fordham,
Notre Dame, Villanova, Dayton, Santa Clara, University of San Francisco, Boston College,
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Ball relates, the sad if not outright duplicitous part of this tale is
that Catholic colleges sometimes "show just enough of a Catholic
face to attract youngsters of Catholic familibs but present a message to all others that they [are], in fact, progressively secular." 2
Unlike the Lemon and Meek and other similar elementary and
secondary religious school efforts, the exchange of faith for funds
worked at the religious college level. In Tilton v. Richardson,6' the
Supreme Court concluded that the religious colleges could be
given government construction grants because "[t]he institutions
presented evidence that there had been no religious services or
worship in the federally financed facilities, that there had been no
religious symbols or plaques in or on them ....

There is no

evidence that religion seeps into the use of these facilities."' One
is reminded of the final scenes of Sir Robert Bolt's A Man for All
Seasons. As Richard Rich perjures himself, Thomas More sees
Rich's newly acquired chain of office signifying that his testimony
had been bought for the Attorney Generalship of Wales. Thomas
More wryly remarks: "Why, Richard, it profits a man nothing to
give his soul for the whole world .

.

. but for Wales!"6' But for

government construction grants, auxiliary services, or even, a modestly higher U.S. News and World Report ranking?
The faith for funds scam manufactured in Tilton is dishonest,
and as Mr. Ball indicates, it has been extended to other churchstate conflicts, such as the private display of religious symbols on
public Property.' In this area, the Court has allowed religious
symbols only if they did not convey a religious message. This obscuring of religious message can be accomplished by hiding the
religious symbol among secular objects like Christmas trees and
civic greetings,67 but then what is the point?

Loyola (Chicago), Detroit-Mercy, University of Saint Thomas, Loyola Marymount and the
University of San Diego advised Archbishop Leibrecht of the encyclical implementation
committee that under the proposed ordinances "a university would be put in an unnecessarily adversarial relationship with the local Bishop, who would be expected to judge the
competency, orthodoxy and probity of life of a professional theologian. Substantial legal
and financial liability could be placed upon the Bishop . . . ." Letter to Archbishop
Leibrecht (Nov. 29, 1993) (on file with the author).
Translation: If the local bishop exercises the proposed authority, expect to be sued.
62 BALL, supra note 2, at 41.
63 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
64 Id. at 680-81.
65 ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 158 (1960).
66 BALL, supra note 2, at 46.
67 See ACLU v. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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No, the Declaration of Independence which gives our government purpose is not neutral toward God, and the Religion
Clauses designed to secure individual religious freedom within the
constitutional structure need not be neutral, either.' And this
suggests why Mr. Ball's later litigation strategy which furthers not
neutrality-driven secularization, but individual choice is his crowning achievement. This was the case of Jimmy Zobrest, a profoundly
deaf high school student who sought federal assistance for a sign
language interpreter that was theoretically available under federal
law to all handicapped students. But Jimmy was in a Catholic high
school, and relying upon Lemon, both lower courts denied him
assistance in that sectarian setting. After all, these courts reasoned,
the interpreter is a state employee and he would be signing everything, including religious instruction.
When Mr. Ball took Jimmy to the Supreme Court, Justice
White asked Mr. Ball if he intended to reconcile all of the Court's
establishment cases. To laughter, Mr. Ball responded, "I will not,
Your Honor." The joke-as Mr. Ball demonstrates thoughtfully in
this book-is at our nation's very dear expense. Founded upon a
false and unworkable premise of neutrality, the Court's Establishment Clause cases are beyond reconciliation. And because they are
so, Mr. Ball's advocacy in Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills School District9
became crucial. He steered the Court past Lemon, which the majority did not even reference in the ultimate Zobrest opinion, by
focusing upon individual religious freedom. The groundwork had
been laid for this in the earlier opinions of Mueller v. Allen70 and
Witters v. Department of Services to the Blind,7 which upheld tuition
tax credits and vocational assistance applied by individuals to either secular or religious institutions. Even in the context of the
Court's unwarranted and confused view of neutrality, there could
be no impermissible endorsement of religion if monies flowed to

68 My colleague John Garvey describes this as the "split-level" character of free exercise law. He writes:
Sometimes religious believers and nonbelievers are treated alike; but sometimes
the law protects only religious believers. This is not something that we can explain by appeals to consent and fairness. It violates the canon of reciprocity.
The only convincing explanation for such a [constitutional] rule is that the law
thinks religion is a good thing.
John H. Garvey, God is Good 23 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
69 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
70 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
71 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
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religious schools as a result of thousands of individual decisions.
Mr. Ball's handling of Zobrest thus crystallized the earlier decisions
into the following axiom:
Government may afford material aid to individuals exercising a
choice to be served by religious educational institutions where
the individual and not the institution is the primary beneficiary
of that aid. The programs must provide benefits to a broad
class of citizens and be religiously "neutral" (i.e., not be primarily religious in character, create no greater or broader
benefits to recipients who apply their aid to religious education, and not limit the benefits in part or in whole to students
at religious institutions)."
The axiom is helpful. It is not perfect. It still contains an unfortunate attachment to the spurious notion of neutrality, although at
least that which is described as having to be neutral is the design
of the government program, not the recipient religious institution
that receives funding as a consequence of individual choice. As
Mr. Ball opines, the axiom is enough to support a "well-drafted
voucher act [against] federal constitutional challenge.""3
But the voucher or school choice programs, well-drafted or
not, have yet to materialize in any significant sense. Perhaps this is
due to the politics of a well-entrenched union7 4 associated with
government schools. It may also be the consequence of selfishness.
Some affluent suburbanites have "captured" their local public
schools, and therefore, see little reason to evenhandedly apportion
general education funds that would allow the less well-off access to
"their" facilities. Most troublesome is Mr. Ball's speculation that
after years of secular inundation and battle, a present generation
of religious adherents, Catholics in particular, may simply have lost
interest in careful instruction in religious doctrine.75
For the moment, I do not share Mr. Ball's pessimistic speculation. As he notes, there are signs of recognition, especially
among Protestant evangelicals and orthodox Jews and Cktholics,
that the longstanding violation of distributive justice can, at last,
be legally rectified. Most recognize that it is too late in the day to
pretend that the public schools can return to some pre-1960s form
of homogenized, Protestant moral instruction that may have then

72
73
74
75

BALL, supra note 2, at 53-54.
Id. at 54.
The National Education Association.
BALL, supra note 2, at 55.
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infused the school system. Nor would such a return be desirable,
as multidenominational religious instruction is intellectually and
spiritually confused. A few members of Congress have vainly
sought to return down this path by suggesting laws that would
mandate the teaching of generic values without religion. Besides
being the equivalent of teaching, flying without a plane, these
proposals hit a snag the moment someone asks what values are to
be taught or how they are to be defined, and why? Again, the selfevident truths of the Declaration, although critically important to
sustain general national purpose, do not a comprehensive curriculum make.
Because of this, during recent years Congress has been unable
to agree on whether to offer meager demonstration grants to
promote honesty, responsibility, and even something insipidly
labeled "caring." A few local communities have had better luck in
getting past the definitional stage because the values of their local
community were still sufficiently tangible and shared within these
smaller geographical settings to be identified. However, for Congress to attempt this nationally raises all of the problems of using
law as a substitute for morality,76 including exacerbated cultural
tension and ultimately vapid standards. As Congressman Richard
Armey said in opposing one such national effort:
I for one, would not tolerate anybody having the presumption
to dare to think they should define who my children are, what
their values are, what their ethics are and who in the hell they
will be in this world. The fact is these people don't know my
children and the fact is they don't love my children. And the
fact is they don't care about my children and the further fact
is they accept no responsibility for the outcome . .. and they

ought, by God, leave my kids alone.77

76

Murray writes:

It is not the function of the legislator to forbid everything that the moral
law forbids, or to enjoin everything that the moral law enjoins. The moral law
governs the entire order of human conduct, personal and social; it extends even
to motivations and interior acts. Law, on the other hand, looks only to the public order of human society; it touches only external acts ....
... It enforces only what is minimally acceptable, and in this sense socially necessary. Beyond this, society must look to other institutions for the elevation and maintenance of its moral standards-that is, to the church, the home,
the school, and the whole network of voluntary associations that concern themselves with public morality in one or other aspect.
MURRAY, supra note 12, at 165-66.
77 Rochelle Sharpe, Efforts to Promote Teaching of Values in Schools Are Sparking Heated
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Congressman Armey's words have great intensity, and in my
judgment, underscore the reasons why parents must directly and
freely choose their children's schools: Teachers come and go while
parents love children always; parents must be free to manifest that
love through one of the most important gifts they can supply-namely, their specific religious tradition.
It cannot be argued that the present state of public schools
allows this. The very idea of a public school in the modem legal
and cultural context of America is one separated from religion.
This was Professor Freund's insight, and he was right, except that
he and the Court drew the wrong conclusion. Theirs was that no
entanglement leads to precluding religious schools (or, more accurately, individual parents choosing to send their children to such
schools) from making rightful claim against the general education
fund. In reality, no entanglement properly leads to a recognition
that the public school can only half educate. At best (and there is
considerable doubt that many public institutions are even up to
this), public schools can pursue what classical scholars call the
intellectual virtues, namely, competencies in art and science and
mathematics and so forth. This instruction may produce a good
car mechanic or a good accountant or a good lawyer; it is not at
all aimed at yielding a good man or woman. Such goodness must
be derived from serious study of the theological virtues of faith,
hope and charity and the cardinal moral virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude.' This simply cannot be 'done
without sending a child to a school that can introduce these theological and moral virtues in ways that are integrated with the acquisition of basic skills and compatible with the family's religious
preference.
It may be argued in response that all parents are presently
free to send their children to a religious school; they merely must
pay for it. The facetious nature of this asserted "freedom" was
aptly rebutted by John Lyon, who writes:
Just how "free" would we be to exercise our right to provide
nourishing food for our children if the government taxed us to
support a state chain of comprehensive supermarkets and required that there be one in every "food district" of the state?

Debate Among Lawmakers, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1994, at A20 (quoting Armey).
78 These observations are made more fully and practically for families in DOUGLAS
W.
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We might set up peoples' food co-ops until we were blue, but
we could not really compete with the government's subsidized
chain. The situation might be minimally tolerable if state stores
offered quality goods. But if, in our suppositious case, the government decided to purvey largely junk food in its subsidized
supermarkets, the situation would be intolerable.'
In his life of litigation and now in this book, Mr. Ball illustrates the lie that it is constitutionally permissible to tax all citizens
to create a common fund for education, but to then exclude
some citizens on the basis of religious belief. In Lemon and subsequent cases, an American Constitution severed from its base in the
Declaration put Ball on the defensive, requiring that he justify
funding as not constituting an establishment of religion. In actuality, as the person of Jimmy Zobrest exemplified, such funding
denials are often a gross disregard of the free exercise of religion.
This unjust and unequal treatment is no more sustainable than if
the government set aside tax monies for cancer research, and
then pronounced that Lutheran or Baptist physicians, or more
broadly any person of faith, need not apply.
Again, it may be claimed that religionists are not excluded
from public funds, the government is merely declining to subsidize
the constitutional freedom to go to a religious school. There is
some facial plausibility to this argument. It falls away, however, as
Lyon points out above, when it is recognized that there are different ways to deny freedom, including the very practical one of
making families pay twice to act on their religious convictions-once to the government in taxes and again to the private
school.
Others may try to finesse the troublesome exclusion of believers from their own money in the public education fund by
denying the premise-that is, that attendance at a public school
prohibits or impedes religious belief or practice. This may be true
for some families; they might be able to have their children attend the public school without formally transgressing church instruction within a particular denomination. For others, however,
this is not the case, as readings or other class exercises directly
contravene church teaching." And as the title to Mr. Ball's book

79 John Lyon, Reclaiming The Schools: Reconciling Home and Education, FAM. IN AM.,
June 1994, at 6.
80 See Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schs., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060-62 (6th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
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reminds us, the Court has also confirmed the right of parents, not
the state, to direct their children's education. It is thus insupportable to make parents choose between their religion and the only
available public support for education in the form of the public
school.
The solution for reuniting education and family in the pursuit
of virtue is obvious: Tax monies for education must once again be
brought under direct family control. Of course, so long as its
requirements are reasonable ones not prohibiting religious belief
or practice,81 the state can mandate that parents have their children educated in certain uniform subject areas and through an
appropriate age. A serious, well-presented course in the self-evident
truths of the Declaration together with an understanding of the
Constitution's text and structure would have my vote. But the state
need not collect and control a family's resources to accomplish
these supplementary regulatory interests. The easiest way to respect
the parents' preeminent role in education would be to provide a
tax credit to parents for reasonable amounts expended on tuition
at the school of their choice. Vouchers are another possibility, but
frankly, there is little administrative reason to have the government collect family money only to return it.
For every child, a family remains the best teacher. Families
find meaning in religious faith, and education and educational
agents outside the home must draw upon that faith, too, or a
child becomes alienated from his or her best instructors and most
influential moral sources. Separation of church and state properly
does keep government out of the tenets of faith, and by the same
token, particular religious dogma out of government policy. For

81 As Mr. Ball demonstrates in later passages in his book, the regulation must not
be indefinable grants of discretion to state authorities impeding the free exercise of religion. In recent years, Christian schools, in particular, have faced licensing battles with
public authorities administering standards calling for "good education," but giving little
additional guidance. BAIL, supra note 2, at 85. One such school which Mr. Ball defended
faced the following amorphous requirement: "Major safeguards for quality education are a
well-designed master schedule, effective routines, adequate undisturbed classtime, and
profusion for a high degree of self-direction on the part of students." Id. at 87. As Ball
reveals, "[n]o witness was able to explain what the 'profusion' business was all about or
to account for the State educators' lapse in English usage." Id. Mr. Ball defeated these
particular regulations in Kentucky, but regrettably other similar efforts await if school
choice becomes the predominant way of distributing the general education fund. These
regulations are particularly pernicious when religious schools are limited to "state-approved" textbooks, curricula, or teachers, and where such approval cannot be shown to
have any direct relationship to educational quality. Id. at 89.
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too long, however, separation of church and state has been improperly used to separate family from education. America's religious freedom does not depend upon either diminishing the primary role of parents as the moral educators of their children or
denying religious schools a proportionate part of the general education fund as a result of the free choice of parents.
Thanks to the perseverance and ingenuity of William Ball, the
Court is closer to formally declaring that school choice programs
offend no part of our Constitution. When individual parents are
making the decisions about how to spend their own funds in the
form of general public benefits, it cannot be seriously argued that
the state is endorsing or establishing religion. This is pretty much
what the trial judge said long ago in Lemon, when Mr. Ball first
stepped forward as God's litigator. We should have listened then;
it is not too late to pay attention now.
II.
It will be recalled that Mr. Ball posited two preconditions for
the continuation of religious schools and the strengthening of parental authority: the first, economic freedom-or a fair distribution
of the general education fund-has been discussed above; the second, freedom from undue governmental regulation is taken up
now.8" These two preconditions mirror in part the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. For example,
the first-economic freedom-is really an injunction not to establish a monopoly state school system that by prescription crowds
out religious schools. The need to avoid unwarranted regulation is
aimed at fulfilling the First Amendment's other promise-that no
law will prohibit the free exercise of religion.
I have emphasized the word "prohibit" because the failure to
adhere to its textual meaning gives rise to unnecessary conflict
between church and state. Every state needs to preserve public
order, and religious practices that threaten that order have always
been outside the shelter of the Free Exercise Clause or state and
colonial counterparts."3 Thus, cults that jeopardize the health and
safety of their members or surrounding neighbors a la David
Koresh have no immunity from generally applicable criminal and
police power prohibitions. There may be factual disagreement in a

82 See id. at 14.
83 See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Diversity, 59 UMKC L. REV. 591, 599-603 (1991).
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case over whether a given practice truly threatens public order,84
but if the state bears a reasonably high burden of proof when
conflict arises, most regulatory errors ought to be avoided.
Difficulties arise, however, when the claims of protected religious liberty are fatuous, either because idiosyncratic personal
behavior is masquerading as religious practice or because the legal
prohibition involved is not a de jure or de facto prohibition at all,
even as it may be a burden. It is impossible, and generally inappropriate, for judges to assay whether a particular practice is genuinely religious. Some caution is required here, however, because
just as the natural law of the Declaration allows judges to see libel
as outside protected speech, so too, claimed religious practices
antagonistic to the self-evident truths of the Republic ought to be
seen as false claims of autonomy or self-actualization.' But placing those extreme practices to one side, most free exercise cases
have concentrated upon either some measurement of the
regulation's impact on religious belief or practice or the sufficiency of the government's justification for the regulation.

84 For example, the animal sacrifice and disposal practices associated with the
Santerian religion were of legitimate health concern to the City of Hialeah, Florida. Nevertheless, the Court invalidated a number of local ordinances which prohibited the practice on the theory that the religion had been improperly singled out for disfavor. Church
of the Lukumi Babaluaye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). As a matter of
precedent, this is a debatable application of the holding in Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), as it seemingly substitutes an "effect" standard for one asking for
generally applicable, neutrally written ordinances. For example, Justice Kennedy wrote:
"[I]t becomes evident that these ordinances target Santeria sacrifice when the ordinances'
operation is considered. Apart from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is
strong evidence of its object." Lukumi Babaluay 113 S. Ct. at 2228 (emphasis supplied).
Had Justice Kennedy not been writing to soften the ill-wisdom of the Smith standard, it can be speculated that the Court might have been more sympathetic to the
City's need to preserve public health. In other words, the focus of the Court should have
been on whether animal sacrifice could be proven to be the health threat the City
claimed. If it was, then presumably there was a compelling interest to prohibit it under
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). As the case got decided, the Court was preoccupied with the side issue derived from Smith of whether the fact that Hialeah did not
simultaneously ban pest extermination and hunting somehow meant that in operation a
ban on animal sacrifice in people's living rooms did not pose a real problem.
85 See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION 154-59 (1994) (arguing
in support of Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith, which he argues is derived from Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), and thus, in his judgment, well aimed at sustaining generally applicable laws supportive of general morality even when they conflict with religious practice). while properly concerned about strained claims of individual "self-actualization" described as religious
practice, Presser's view does not adequately deal with religious practices like those in
Yoder which not only do not threaten general morality, but strengthen it.
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The case that scholars uniformly agree gives these considerations proper constitutional focus is Wisconsin v. Yoder,86 and once
again, William Bentley Ball handled the litigation. Mr. Ball's retelling of this court battle may be the most moving and poignant of
the cases included in the book. The issue: Whether Wisconsin's
mandatory high school attendance law could be constitutionally
applied to the Old Order Amish, who as a matter of religious
practice educate their children at home after 8th grade. On one
side of this battle was a local school district that seemed more
annoyed by the loss of revenue occasioned by having fewer students in the government school than anything else; on the other,
were Jonas and Wallace Miller, whose peaceable Amish faith
shunned "lawyering" as much as possible, but out of necessity,
consented to be defended by Mr. Ball.
The case had national significance. Across the country, school
officials were "physically herding Amish children into buses to
force them into state-prescribed education."7 As was Mr. Ball's
practice in virtually every litigation described in the book, he
made initial efforts to resolve the matter without trial. In Yoder,
this was especially appropriate given Amish tenets, but as Ball puts
it, the school superintendent's "reply was a stiff-arm. Only if the
Amish children were enrolled in schools affording instruction 'substantially similar' to that of the public schools could they be exempted."88 This, as a matter of scriptural conviction, they could
not do, even to the point of feeling conscientiously bound not to
pay the relatively small truancy fines that were imposed. "Hence
they realized that the ugly business of new fines, jailing, liens,
foreclosures, and being forced to sell out and move on was what
now likely lay ahead for them, their families and, doubtless soon,
for all Wisconsin Amish." 9
This was not to be their fate. In part, this was due to Mr.
Ball's fine lawyering, but it was also due to the resolute nature of
the Amish faith. To the latter point, it is worth comparing the
more equivocal or complacent Catholic reaction to what some
might say is a comparable religious infringement-the denial of
proportionate funding and mandatory attendance laws that force
many Catholic families into public school settings greatly at odds
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406 U.S. 205 (1972).
BAL.L, supra note 2, at 59-60.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 63.
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with Catholic social teaching. As the stories of Lemon, Meek, Tilton,
and similar cases unfolded, the Catholic reaction was often to
accommodate religion to secular demand-that is, to try to find
ways to separate religious belief from secular subject. By contrast,
the Amish response was to state their faith plainly and accept the
secular consequences. Mr. Ball brought into court Professor John
Hostetler, a Temple University historian, to make the point: "[I]f
the Amish youth are required to attend the value system of the
[public] high school as we know it today, the church community
cannot last long. It will be destroyed."9"
The state made its presentation suggesting that if the Amish
were exempted from the public high school, delinquency or unproductive lives would result. To these assertions, Mr. Ball applied
a mastery of detail and trial craft. Calling the local constable, Mr.
Ball went through a litany of potential offenses: murder, burglary,
robbery, arson, assault, narcotics, vandalism, loitering, theft, reckless driving, and asked in regard to each how many Old Order
Amish had ever been arrested on such charges. The sheriff's repeated answer: "None." Next was the county's director of social
services. Again, the stable, upright character of the Amish
emerged. No illegitimate births. No Amish in the county home.
No increased welfare burden whatsoever. As for productivity, the
picture of the Amish child that emerged from the testimony was
that of a teenager "given great responsibility ... driving horses,
working in the fields, which the suburban child is not getting."9
To the contrary, the adolescent in a public high school was shown
to dwell within an "educational system [that] is detached from the
real world ....
talk[ing] about things that they don't become involved in, [and] for which they feel no sense of responsibility."92
And then, Mr. Ball recounts what he, himself, describes as
one of those "occasional moments when the heat generated by the
collision of counsel reach a point of explosion."9 " The nature of
this explosion was an Amish witness' thoughtful posture in response to the persistent insistence of the prosecutor that attending
public high school was necessary to allow a child to "make his or
her place in the world." The question drew a prolonged silence,

90 Id. at 68 (quoting the testimony of Professor John Hostetler).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 70 (quoting the testimony of Dr. Donald A. Erickson of the University of
Chicago).
93 Id. at 69.
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and then the telling answer: "It depends which world." 4 Indeed,
it does. As Mr. Ball states, the answer went to the heart of the
case. It goes to the heart of the book-children, mere creatures of
the state? No, creatures of parents acting as co-creators with God.
Creatures who, in the words of John Paul II, disappear when separated from their Creator. 95
Nevertheless, the trial and appellate judges ruled against the
Amish. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, but the state persisted and following oral argument in the U.S. Supreme Court,
Mr. Ball penned a note to his colleague: "We have lost."9
Mr. Ball was wrong, and instead, he and all who value religious freedom relished the opinion of Chief Justice Warren Burger that ruled in favor of the Amish and placed in law a constitutional analysis that required the state to have a compelling interest
before it prohibited a religious practice. Burger wrote:
[T]his case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as
contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future
and education of their children. The history and culture of
Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children
is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition."
Every now and then, God allows us to see truth despite our
human imperfection. The Court's opinion in Yoder was such an
occasion; it grasped the essential self-evident truth of the Declaration, at least as it pertains to the relationship between parent and
child, and the importance of that relationship to the "pursuit of
happiness," and indeed, each person's transcendent end. Not
surprisingly, those originalists, like Robert Bork, who fail to grasp
the necessary nexus between Declaration and Constitution have
criticized Yoder." Even worse, a jurist of Catholic training,
Antonin Scalia, effectively undid the importance of Yoder by byzan-

94 Id.
95 "'Without its Creator the creature simply disappears .... If God is ignored the
creature itself is impoverished.'" Pope John Paul II,THE SPLENDOR OF TRUTH (VERrrATS
SPIENDOR) 55 (St. Paul ed. 1993) (paragraph 39) (quoting Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modem World Gaudium etSpes, 36).
96 BALL, supra note 2, at 71.
97 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
98 See BALL, supra note 2, at 74 (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA
49 (1990)).
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tine distinction in the later case of Employment Division v. Smith,'
and in so doing, the constitutional standard protecting religious
liberty was lowered. Now, instead of needing a compelling interest
to effectively prohibit a religious practice or belief, the government merely needed to have any hypothetical rational basis. In
terms of governmental justification for regulatory action, religious
liberty was thus put on par with the regulation of the sale of soap
or any other commercial product. In Mr. Ball's blunt assessment,
Smith "thrust the Free Exercise Clause to the back of the constitutional bus."'0 0
In fairness, all the blame cannot be laid upon the opinion of
Justice Scalia in Smith. In the intervening eighteen years between
Yoder and Smith, the Court honored the Yoder standard more in
name, than fact.' Smith also had the salutary benefit of keeping
federal judges from making an impermissible inquiry into the
centrality of particular religious beliefs.0 2 So too, the Smith opinion may be understood as a reaction to claims of religious liberty
that were premised more on burden, than prohibition. Denials of
or the insistence upon
unemployment compensation benefits'
exemption from social security withholding'04 may not, in fact,
be "prohibitions" of religious exercise. They hardly seem equivalent to hauling Amish children out of their homes to have them
attend public high school. Nevertheless, the Smith opinion is especially problematic given the pervasive nature of the regulatory state
which, under the terms of the opinion, has little reason to be
concerned when generally phrased, prohibitory regulation suppresses religious practice."' As Mr. Ball observes:
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494 U.S. 872 (1990).
BALL, supra note 2, at 107.
See Kmiec, supra note 83, at 596-97. But compare Durham & Dushku, supra note
451, who note that while the Supreme Court did, in fact, sustain few free exercise
after Yoder,

[T]his argument fails to take into account the number of free exercise claims
that have been vindicated in lower courts and, even more significantly, the incalculable number of instances in which lower level officials have been deterred
from encroaching on religious liberty so long as the compelling state interest
test could be invoked.
102 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87.
103 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
104 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
105 Mr. Ball recounts how the NLRB sought to govern the employment relationship
between Catholic school teachers and parish schools. Ultimately, this issue was resolved by
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[I]n our age, when government is expanding into every area of
human existence, [] this newly invented Smith test is most
threatening. The Congress, fifty state legislatures, and thousands of municipalities are consistently grinding out myriad
statutes, ordinances and regulations. When, as too often happens, these impinge (intentionally or inadvertently) on religious
interests, religion is [largely] without defenses [under

Smith]

....

106

On the analysis of some of these cases, Mr. Ball and I, or
other students of the Constitution, may disagree. In particular, Mr.
Ball thinks the problem with the pre-Smith cases is not so much
the overbroad characterization of religious burden as prohibition,
but "whether the Court made [the government] prove that a compelling state interest justified its actions and that no less drastic
means were at its disposal to accomplish what it wanted to
do."' O7 Perhaps. More likely, it is a combination of factors. For
the moment, the discussion may be moot, because even as Congress has purported to reverse Smith by statute,'" there is genuine concern that such re-statement of judicial rule is beyond the
legislative power,"° and the restoration of Yoder-and with it reli-

the Supreme Court finding that since coverage would raise "serious constitutional questions," the statutory ambiguity over coverage in the National Labor Relations Act should
be resolved against coverage. BALL, supra note 2, at 98 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop

of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)).
106 Id. at 107. Similar and even more devastating criticism has been aimed at Smith
by a host of commentators. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercis4
1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, God is Dead and We Have Killed Him! Freedom of Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 163.
107 BALL, supra note 2, at 105.
108 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Star- 1488
(1993).
109 BALL, supra note 2, at 108; see also PRESSER, supra note 85, at 241; Kmiec, supra
note 83, at 591 n.5. But see Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive
Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REv. 1, 64 (1994) (arguing that
Congress' remedial power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is sufficient to sustain the Act). Professor Laycock also argues for the constitutionality of RFRA on similar
grounds, stating "RFRA does not assert Fourteenth Amendment power where there is no
plausible Fourteenth Amendment claim." Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Ac 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 221, 250. This argument is dubious. Arguably, Congress only has
§ 5 authority to remedy that which has been found by judicial interpretation to be a
constitutional violation. Generally applicable, neutral statutes that prohibit religious practice were held in Smith not to be a constitutional violation. True, the Court invited state
and federal legislatures to craft statutory religious exemptions from generally applicable
laws as they saw fit. The Court, however, did not invite Congress or the states to indulge
a different standard of what constitutes religious infringement to apply across the
board-that is, contrary to Professor Laycock, not crafting exemption, but finding remedy
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gious freedom-may well have to wait the Court's recognition of
its own error.
If the Court is to find its way, it will likely need the luminous
mind of William Bentley Ball. Having spent a professional lifetime
in the role of God's litigator, can we ask him for more? I do not
know. No accolade-however well deserved-will be sufficient
enticement. At this juncture, William Ball is surely entitled to
simply respond with a clever bit of doggerel reminding us that
"Great Caeser's dead and on the shelf/And I don't feel so well
myselfl" ° One suspects, however, that until God Himself directs
the verdict, this very able and competent legal advisor will continue to stand upright at counsel table in defense of our need, and
that of our children, to rely upon God freely.

where the Court has found no violation. While the result in RFRA may be desirable, it is
a dangerous and perverse matter to contemplate Congress overruling the Constitution
and constitutional interpretation by statute. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Testimony before
the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar.
4, 1992) (arguing that the Freedom of Choice Act exceeds Congress' § 5 authority insofar as the Act "codifies" an abortion claim more expansive than that specified by the
Court in its abortion cases); see also Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: Letting the Fox into the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16
CARDOZO L. REv. 357 (1994). Recently, a district court found RFRA to be unconstitutional along similar reasoning. Flores v. City of Boerne, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3675 (Mar.
15, 1995).
110 Arthur Gutterman, On the Vanity of Earthly Greatness, in THEMES IN LrrERATURE 478
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